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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
respondent Grand County School District and against appellant 
Jolene Welch on the grounds that appellant's incapacity to per-
form contracted services justified respondent's termination of 
the parties' employment contract. The sole issue on appeal, 
then, is whether the District Court properly applied the law as 
it relates to incapacity and excuse of nonperformance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a wrongful termination case. The District Court 
granted Summary Judgment in favor of respondent employer Grand 
County School District and against appellant, the employee, on 
June 10, 1985. Thereafter, appellant moved the District Court 
to set aside that judgment, and requested a hearing on said 
motion. After a hearing on appellant's request, the District 
Court agreed to reconsider its ruling granting summary judgment 
in favor of respondent. Upon reconsideration, the District 
Court again granted Summary Judgment in favor of respondent 
Grand County School District. It is from this final judgment 
dismissing her Complaint that appellant appeals. 
B. Disposition in the Lover Court 
1. Appellant filed a Verified Complaint on or about 
January 2, 1984. See Verified Complaint and Summons, copies 
attached hereto as Appendix "A." 
2. Respondent answered on or about January 22, 1985 and 
filed Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on or 
about April 10, 1985. See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories, copy attached hereto as Appendix 
nB." 
3. On or about May 13, 1985, respondent filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with accompanying Memorandum and Affidavit in support thereof. 
See copies of the Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, attached 
hereto as Appendix "C." Appellant filed no objection to the 
Motion, no Memorandum in Opposition, and no counter-affidavits. 
4. On May 28, 1985, the District Court issued a Ruling 
granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and on June 
10, 1985, signed an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
respondent Grand County School District. See copies of Ruling 
and Order, attached hereto as Appendix "D." 
5. On or about June 19, 1985, appellant filed a Motion to 
Set Aside Summary Judgment, accompanied by an Affidavit from 
appellant's legal counsel and a Memorandum. 
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6. Respondent subsequently filed an Objection to Plain-
tiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment, 
accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Oppo-
sition to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment, 
with an attached Affidavit of Counsel. 
7. Appellant then filed a Request for Hearing on Motion 
to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment. The Court set 
the hearing for July 31, 1985. See copies of Appellant's 
Request and the Court's Notice, attached hereto as Appendix "E.M 
8. At the hearing, appellant's counsel provided the Dis-
trict Court and respondent's counsel with an Affidavit signed 
by appellant and with a Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgm-
ent. See copies of appellant's Affidavit and her counsel's 
Memorandum, attached hereto as Appendix "F." 
9. Following the hearing on July 31, 1985, respondent 
filed a Reply Memorandum in response to appellant's Memorandum 
referred to in paragraph 8, next above, and a Motion to Strike 
Affidavit, requesting the District Court to strike a paragraph 
of the Affidavit which was filed with the Court at the July 31 
hearing. See respondent's Reply Memorandum and Motion to 
Strike, copies attached hereto as Appendix "G." 
10. On September 6, 1985, the District Court issued a 
Ruling Upon Reconsideration of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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wherein the Court granted respondent's Motion to Strike with 
respect to the challenged paragraph of appellant's Affidavit/ 
and also once again granted respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See copy of Ruling, attached hereto as Appendix "H." 
11. On September 24, 1985, the District Court entered 
Summary Judgment against appellant, dismissing her Complaint 
with prejudice. See copy of Summary Judgment, attached hereto 
as Appendix "I." 
C. Facts of the Case 
1. In August of 1980, appellant Jolene Welch made appli-
cation to and was hired by Grand County School District as a 
bus driver for the school year 1980-81. In July or August of 
1981, 1982 and 1983, appellant and respondent entered into 
employment agreements for each of the respective school years 
listed. See Affidavit of Bill Meador, Superintendent of Grand 
County School District, and documents attached thereto, copy 
attached hereto in Appendix MC." 
2. On September 23, 1983, after approximately one month 
on the job, appellant was injured in a work-related accident. 
As a result of the injury, appellant entered into the care of a 
physician, was not able to continue working, and received work-
men's compensation from the State Insurance Fund for the work-
related injury. See Affidavit of plaintiff, copy attached 
hereto as Appendix "F"; Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, supra. 
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3. At the time appellant was injured, she was working 
under an employment contract with respondent Grand County 
School District. The term of the contract was for the 1983-84 
school year, covering a nine-month employment period. See 
Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra; Affidavit of plaintiff, supra; 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interroga-
tories, supra. 
A. After appellant's injury in September of 1983, appel-
lant, under doctor's orders, was not allowed to return to work 
until after the expiration of the nine-month period of the 
employment contract. See Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra; 
Affidavit of plaintiff, supra.. 
5. After appellant was injured in September of 1983, 
respondent hired a bus driver on a part-time basis to cover 
appellant's bus route. This part-time driver fulfilled all of 
appellant's full-time responsibilities, but received none of 
the full-time benefits, i.e. medical insurance, reserved for 
appellant because of the substitute driver's part-time status. 
See Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra; Defendant's Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, supra. 
6. On or about January 31, 1984, appellant met with 
respondent's Superintendent of Schools, Bill Meador. At that 
meeting, appellant informed respondent that, under doctor's 
orders, she could not return to work for an indefinite period 
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of time but not sooner than some time after the end of the 
1983-84 school year. At that same meeting, respondent informed 
appellant that because of appellant*s inability to return to 
work, respondent would fill appellant's full-time bus driver 
position by giving full-time employment to the part-time 
driver, who had been performing appellant's contractual duties 
in appellant's absence for approximately four months. ],d. 
7. Also at the January, 1984 meeting, respondent informed 
appellant that respondent would continue appellant's medical 
insurance coverage through June of 1984. Id. 
8. At all times pertinent hereto, Grand County School 
District bus drivers were not represented by the Grand Educa-
tion Association (GEA) in contract negotiations with the Dis-
trict, but were "classified personnel" and subject to terms of 
employment separate and distinct from "certificated personnel," 
who were represented by GEA. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no issue as to any material fact. Appellant and 
respondent entered into an employment contract for the personal 
bus-driving services of appellant. Said contract was for a 
fixed period of time, the term of the contract being the reg-
ular school year of 1983-84. Shortly after the beginning of 
the contract term, appellant was injured in a work-related 
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activity and thereafter received workman's compensation bene-
fits for that injury. Because of the injury, appellant could 
no longer perform the services required under the employment 
contract. 
As a matter of law, respondent was justified in the termi-
nation of appellant's employment. Appellant had not performed 
a substantial and material portion of her contract and prospec-
tively could not perform the services contracted for. Appel-
lant's incapacity discharged respondent from performance, ter-
minated the contract, or excused any nonperformance on the part 
of respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
Appellant's Verified Complaint alleged that appellant's 
employment contract with respondent Grand County School Dis-
trict included the following: (a) appellant's "employment was 
for an indefinite term"; (b) employment contracts would be 
tendered to appellant on an annual basis "provided her work 
performance was satisfactory"; and (c) "as long as her job per-
formance was satisfactory" appellant had "job security" with 
respondent. See appellant's Verified Complaint at 1f1[ 5, 6 and 
8, copy attached hereto as Appendix "A." Respondent moved the 
-7-
lower court for dismissal, arguing that, based upon these alle-
gations, the termination was not actionable under the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, which currently is the law in Utah. The 
lower court, however, did not rule upon this motion to dismiss, 
nor did it respond to the legal argument supporting it. 
Rather, the lower court ruled on respondent's alternative 
motion for summary judgment, which motion was based upon the 
law of contracts as it relates to incapacity and excuse of non-
performance. 
Subsequent to the lower court's order granting summary 
judgment, appellant admitted by Affidavit and in Memorandum of 
legal counsel that the employment contract in question was for 
a definite term, the 1983-84 school year. See Affidavit of 
plaintiff and Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on 
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment, copies 
attached hereto in Appendix "F." According to the law, the 
employment-at-will doctrine generally applies only where the 
employment contract is for an indefinite term. See Bihlmaier 
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). Admission by appellant 
that her employment contract was for a definite term of approx-
imately nine months (the normal school year period), in contra-
diction to the allegations of her Verified Complaint, rein-
forces the wisdom of the lower court's original decision to 
avoid application of the employment-at-will doctrine and the 
motion to dismiss based thereon. 
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Thus, there is no dispute of fact with respect to the term 
of the employment contract. There is also no dispute with 
respect to the following: (a) approximately one month after 
the employment period began, appellant received a work-related 
injury; (b) said injury required professional medical atten-
tion; (c) as a result of said injury, appellant was unable to 
continue her contracted employment, and thereafter received 
workman's compensation payments; (d) respondent hired a part-
time bus driver to perform the services called for in appel-
lant's contract, but could not provide this part-time driver 
with the benefits associated with full-time contract status; 
(e) after approximately four months' time, wherein the part-
time substitute performed the appellant's full-time contractual 
responsibilities, on or about January 31, 1984, appellant met 
with respondent's Superintendent of Schools, and informed him 
that she was under doctor's orders not to return to her bus-
driving responsibilities until after the close of the current 
school year; (f) at that same meeting between appellant and 
respondent's Superintendent, the Superintendent informed 
appellant that respondent would hire the part-time substitute 
bus driver as a full-time replacement for appellant, but that, 
as a benefit to appellant, respondent would continue appel-
lant's insurance coverage through June of 1984. 
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Appellant argues that a factual dispute exists with respect 
to the policies of respondent school district in offering 
annual employment contracts to satisfactorily performing non-
certificated, classified district employees such as bus 
drivers- Appellant's Brief at p. 6. Appellant attempted, by 
affidavit, to establish as fact consistent with this argument 
certain employment policies of the respondent. The lower 
court, however, granted respondent's Motion to Strike the para-
graphs of appellant's affidavit which attempted to set forth 
such policies, and the court's granting of the motion is not 
here appealed. There are no counter-affidavits or other admis-
sible evidence disputing the facts regarding these policies, as 
these facts are set forth by respondent, and no factual dispute 
exists with respect thereto. The policies of the respondent 
district are clearly enunciated by respondent's Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and by the Affidavit 
of respondent's Superintendent. 
Appellant also argues that evidence regarding the terms of 
the employment contract in question was not heard by the lower 
court, and that this mandates reversal of the summary judg-
ment. Appellant's Brief at p. 5. Appellant filed her Verified 
Complaint in December of 1984. Prior to the time respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed in May of 1985, appellant sent written 
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Interrogatories to respondent, the answers to which gave 
details of the terms of the contract, and appellant had suffi-
cient time to engage in other discovery. At no time has appel-
lant told the lower court, by affidavit or otherwise, that 
additional time for discovery was necessary. In any event, 
terms of the employment contract were set forth by respondent 
in answers to written interrogatories and by affidavit of 
respondent's Superintendent. Appellant's claim that evidence 
as yet undiscovered may create a dispute of fact, is unsub-
stantiated. 
Appellant relies on the allegations of her Verified Com-
plaint in an attempt to put at issue material facts. Appel-
lant's Brief at pp. 3-6. Appellant "cannot rely upon the mere 
allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary 
judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 
936 (Utah 1979). Appellant has not set forth specific facts. 
Rather, appellant suggests, inter alia, that respondent's neg-
ligence in using "substandard and unsafe" equipment on the bus 
appellant drove caused appellant's injury and that this culp-
able behavior on the part of respondent warrants reversal of 
the summary judgment. Appellant also asserts that she was 
ready, willing and able to perform her bus-driving duties in 
May of 1984, see Appellant's Brief at p. 17, but no facts cor-
roborate the assertion. To the contrary, appellant swore in her 
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Affidavit that it was August of 1984, not May, before she was 
able to perform bus-driving services. See Affidavit of plain-
tiff, supra. Without a proper evidentiary foundation to sup-
port them, mere assertions are insufficient to preclude grant-
ing of summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d X170, 1172 
(Utah 1983). These unsupported assertions can only be attempts 
to obfuscate the clear legal basis for the lower court's sum-
mary judgment; they do not create any issue or dispute as to 
any material fact. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, APPELLANT"S EXTENDED 
INABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT EXCUSED RESPONDENT'S NONPERFORMANCE. 
It is a general rule of law that, in the absence of a stip-
ulation to the contrary, an employment contract for personal 
services is terminated by the employee's sickness or disability 
which renders the employee unable to perform his contract. See 
generally 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant S 38, at p. 114 
(1970); 6 Corbin on Contracts, S 1334 (1962). Where the sub-
ject matter of an employment agreement is the daily conveyance 
of children to and from school over a long period of time, when 
the safety of the children and the necessity for exercise by 
the school district of great care in selecting a trustworthy, 
competent and careful bus driver are taken into consideration, 
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such an agreement is for the personal services of that particu-
lar bus driver. Folquet v. Woodburn Public Schools, 146 Or. 
339, 29 P.2d 554, 556-57 (1934). Here, the employment agree-
ment between appellant Jolene Welch and respondent Grand County 
School District was one for the personal services of appel-
lant. By application of law, appellant's inability to perform 
those services terminated the employment agreement. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never had this issue 
squarely before it, numerous other state appellate courts have 
applied this generally accepted rule of law to factual circum-
stances not dissimilar to the instant case. The Supreme Court 
of Wyoming, in Fisher v. Church of St. Mary, 497 P.2d 882 (Wyo. 
1972), applied this rule to affirm a lower court's judgment for 
the defendant employer where the plaintiff teacher contracted 
to teach in defendant's school system for ten months commencing 
August 31, 1970, but on November 12 suffered a cerebral hemor-
rhage and was unable to resume her teaching duties prior to 
April 1, 1971. Defendant hired a full-time replacement com-
mencing February 1, 1971. The Wyoming court held that con-
tracts like the one before it, made "to perform personal acts," 
are made on the implied condition that the parties will be 
alive and capable of performing the contract so that death or 
disability, including sickness, "will operate as a discharge, 
termination of the contract or excuse for non-performance." 
Id. at 884 (footnote and citations omitted). 
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The Wyoming court added that "after the breach has become 
material or the prospective incapacity is such as to justify 
termination the employer has an election to continue the con-
tract or to terminate it." Id. Holdings similar to Fisher are 
found in Smith v. Bd> of Ed. of the Ft. Madison Community Sch. 
Dist., 293 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1980); Shawsheen Dairy, Inc. v. 
Keefe, 29 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1940); Rodriguez v. Civil Service 
Comm'n., 582 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Citizen's Home 
Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1950); Oneal 
v, Colton Consolidated Sch. Dist., 16 Wash. App. 488, 557 P.2d 
11 (1976); See also Annotation 21 A.L.R.2d 1247. 
The facts of the instant case argue more compellingly for 
application of this rule of law than did the facts in Fisher. 
There, the plaintiff was able to perform 2-1/2 months of her 
ten-month contract, was then incapacitated for another 2-1/2 
months, and at the time of replacement, with five months 
remaining in the contract term, her prospective incapacity 
would extend through two more months, leaving the prospect of 3 
months1 work at the end of the contract term. Thus, the plain-
tiff in Fisher would have been able to work 5-1/2 months of the 
ten-month contract term. Yet, the Wyoming court held that 
plaintiff's inability to perform the contracted personal ser-
vices for a substantial and material portion of the contract 
term, justified termination and excused any nonperformance on 
the part of the defendant school district. 
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Here, appellant worked for one month of her nine-month con-
tract, became incapacitated, and was unable to return to work 
thereafter. The personal services for which respondent had 
contracted could not be performed for eight of the nine months 
of the contract term. As in Fisher, the appellant's substan-
tial and material incapacity to perform, by application of law, 
justified respondent's replacement of appellant and excused any 
nonperformance of contractual obligations by respondent. 
It is immaterial whether appellant was terminated in 
January of 1984, as the facts show, or in May of 1984, as 
appellant suggests in her Brief. It is also immaterial whether 
respondent's alleged breach of contract occurred, as appellant 
indirectly argues, in August of 1984 when appellant's employ-
ment contract was not renewed. Even assuming, arguendo, that, 
as appellant alleges without substantiation, appellant's 
employment contract would be automatically renewed annually and 
that this automatic renewal was a term of her employment con-
tract with respondent, appellant's inability to perform her 
portion of the contract nevertheless excused any nonperformance 
by respondent, including this alleged failure to automatically 
renew. 
No reasonable mind could disagree that incapacity pre-
venting performance of eight months of a nine-month personal 
service contract was substantial and material, such that any 
nonperformance with respect to the contract would be excused. 
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As a matter of law, the termination of appellant's employment 
was justified, respondent was excused from any nonperformance, 
the contract was terminated without breach, and/or respondent's 
duty to perform was discharged. 
POINT III 
"EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL" DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICA-
TION HERE. 
This Court need not and should not consider appellant's 
extended argument in her Brief dealing with the doctrine of 
"employment-at-will" and its gradual erosion in jurisdictions 
other than Utah. Admissions by appellant that her employment 
contract was for a definite term, that is, the nine-month 
1983-84 school year, precludes application of the doctrine and 
removes same from issue here. Admittedly, the doctrine was 
argued by respondent as grounds for its motion to dismiss, but 
alternative legal basis was presented for respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and it was this alternative argument that 
was adopted by the District Court in its grant of Summary Judg-
ment. Appellant's reliance on this argument as forming the 
primary basis of respondent's Motion for, and the District 
Court's Granting of, Summary Judgment is misplaced. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no issue as to any material fact in this case. 
Appellant's inability to perform more than one month of a 
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nine-month personal services employment contract excused 
respondent's nonperformance. Appellant's termination was 
therefore justified and the District Court's Summary Judgment 
should be, and it is hereby respectfully requested that it be, 
affirmed. ^ 
DATED this o ^ day of January, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Allan-
Christopher JS—duller 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Grand County School 
District 
SCM1904P 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Served this C'*.. 
TKI . £> ., _De'enc'2;;t 
TJ«ne„<L£ 
COFFMAN t COFFMAN 
Penelope D. Coffman 
59 East Center Street 
Drawer J 
Moab, Utah 81532-1371 
Telephone: (801)259-5102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Deputy sttei jff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CRAND COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
CIVIL NO. 
SUMMONS 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an 
Answer In writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the 
above-entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to, Penelope D. 
Coffman, COFFMAN 6 COFFMAN, 59 East Center Street, Post Office 
Drawer J , Moab, Utah 81532, Plaintiff's attorney, a copy of said 
Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon 
you. 
If you fail so to do, Judgment may be taken against 
you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been filed 
with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed 
and herewith served upon you. 
DATED thi%^jffiday of December, A.D. 19B1. 
COFFMAN 6 COFFMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COFFMAN & COFFMAN 
Penelope D. Coffman 
59 East Center Street 
Post Office Drawer J 
Moab, Utah 84532-1371 
Telephone: (801)259-5102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant, 
CIVI L NO. - 2 X ^ 3 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
ft 
NOW COMES your Plaintiff and respectfully 
represents unto this Honorable Court as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That at all times material, the Defendant Grand 
County School District employed educators and support personnel 
for the purpose of operating a school system in Grand County, 
Utah. 
2. That at all times material, each employee in the 
District was responsible to the Board of Education through its 
superintendent, Bill B. Meador. 
3. That at all times material, the educators in and 
District were represented by the G.E.A. Union and its 
representatives negotiated on an annua! basis, the terms of each 
year's contract. 
H. That in August, 1WT1, Jolene L. Welch made 
application to the Grand County School District for a position as 
bus driver. She was advised by Elmer E. Dravage, Business 
Manager of the Board of Education for the Grand County School 
District, that bus drivers enjoyed the same negotiated benefits of 
employment that the educators had gained by negotiations with the 
exception of the number of days for sick leave. These benefits 
included, but were not limited to, life insurance, disability 
insurance and vacation time. 
5. That at the time of her employment. Plaintiff 
was advised that yearly contracts would be sent out each June 
which would state the wage and reflect any changes. Plaintiff 
understood that contracts would be tendered to her annually 
provided her work performance was satisfactory. 
6. Your Plaintiff thereafter commenced to work for 
the Grand County School District, relying upon the representations 
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of Elmer Dravage that the union contract in effect with the 
educators was the implied contract with the exception of sick leaves 
that covered the bus drivers and that as long as her job 
performance was satisfactory she could rely upon the job security. 
7. That in accordance with the standards of the 
Board of Education, your Plaintiffs job performance was evaluated 
regularly and she never received a negative evaluation. 
£ 8. That at all times Plaintiffs supervisors advised 
her that her employment was for an indefinite term, the amount of 
the wage to be negotiated every June, and that her job performance 
was satisfactory. 
9. That, pursuant to the direction of her 
immediate supervisor, your Plaintiff occasionally transported 
children with special educational needs. That the vehicle your 
Plaintiff was instructed to use on September 2, 1983 did not comply 
with the minimum standards prescribed by the Utah Transportation 
Commission, which standards are promulgated by authority of 
Section 41-6-115 of the Utah Code Annotated, such standards being 
set forth in the "Minimum Standards for Utah School Buses11 and 
"Utah School Bus Driver Handbook" as Chapters 30-43. 
That notwithstanding the lack of mechanical 
apparatus to lift a child into a vehicle, in order to perform her job. 
xr * 
}-> the Plaintiff lifted a child into the vehicle on September 23, 1983. 
That at the time of lifting a handicapped child wearing braces and 
in a wheelchair, she bore weight on her right leg and turned to 
adjust the position of the child. At that time, your Plaintiff 
sustained a back injury. 
10. That the State Insurance Fund, workman's 
. compensation carrier for the Grand County School District, 
compensated her for this injury. 
11 . That on January 6, 1984, your Plaintiff called 
Superintendent Bill B. Meador's office and was told that if she did 
) 
not return to work by the end of January she would be replaced. 
That at the time of this conversation, your Plaintiff was under a 
doctors care, had not been released for work, and was still being 
compensated by the State Insurance Fund for a work-related injury. 
12. That on January 30, 1984, your Plaintiff again 
talked with Superintendent Bill B. Meador and was told that he was 
U going to let her go. When Plaintiff asked for a blue slip or some 
other indication of termination, he told her that he was going to 
hold her on the payroll until the end of May for insurance reasons. 
13. That on May 17, 1984, your Plaintiff called Bill 
Meador and told him the doctor would release her to return to work 
on or before August 2 1 , 1984. Mr. Meador told your Plaintiff she 
y
 did not have a job, but refused to give her a blue slip or any 
evidence of termination. Subsequently, on the 29th day of June, 
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1984, your Plaintiff received a letter stating her insurance was 
cancelled. 
14. That the Handbook of Selected Policies and 
Rules approved and adopted by the Grand County Board of 
Education, provides inter alia, in 4119.1, for the orderly 
termination procedures without discrimination. Your Plaintiff had a 
written contract of employment with the school district, and based 
upon the representations to her of Elmer Dravage that 
non-educators were protected by these provisions, she believes that 
she is entitled to the protection of these provisions, to-wit: (1) 
receiving a notice prior to the end of the contract, in wrfting of 
intent not to employ; (2) right of a fair hearing concerning 
employment status or a right to an informal conference. 
15. That your Plaintiff believes that the date upon 
which her insurance was cancelled by the school district is the 
effective date of termination although she has made demand for a 
blue slip and has not received a blue slip or any other indication of 
termination. 
16. That the Defendant has terminated the Plaintiff 
contrary to the policies and procedures of the Defendant and in 
violation of the implied contract the Defendant had with the support 
employees. 
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17. That the Defendant has wrongfully discharged 
your Plaintiff, and such a discharge is against public policy in that 
her absenteeism resulted from a job-related injury for which 
workman's compensation benefits were paid throughout her period of 
absenteeism. 
18. That Plaintiff, as a direct result of this 
wrongful termination, has sustained a loss of income, both present 
and future, incurred expenses associated with a search for 
employment, suffered a loss of pension benefits and other 
employment benefits, and has been damaged in other regards. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
19. That the Plaintiff incorporates by reference, 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of her First 
Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein. 
20. That actions of the Defendant in terminating 
the Plaintiffs employment as described above were outrageous and 
extreme, going beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be 
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. 
20. That the Defendant's actions were done 
intentionally and recklessly without regard for the rights of the 
Plaintiff. 
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2 1 . That as a direct result of the Defendant's 
outrageous conduct in terminating the Plaintiffs employment, the 
Plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
22. That the Plaintiff incorporates by reference 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of the First 
Cause of Action and paragraphs 19-21 of the Second Cause of 
Action, as if fully set forth herein. 
23. That the actions of the Defendant in 
terminating the Plaintiffs employment were attended by 
circumstances of fraud, malice and a wanton or reckless disregard 
for the rights and feelings of the Plaintiff, thereby entitling the 
Plaintiff to reasonable exemplary damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against 
the Defendant for compensatory and exemplary damages as 
determined by the trier of fact, for costs, interest from the date of 
termination, expert witness fees, deposition expenses, and such 
other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. 
DATED this ff day ofAugust , A . D . 1984. 
VLVVLWe> • U^vAfl^ Jo]?ne L. Welch 
Penelope D. Cortman 
Coffman 6 Coffman, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Grand 
) 
) ss. 
) 
JOLENE L. WELCH the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That she has read the above and foregoing 
instrument and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to 
the best of her knowledge except as to matters therein slated on 
information and as to such matters, she believes it to be true. 
W n e L. Weldh " ^ ~ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .day of 
r A . D . 1981. 
^xf>l£fa//to/ 
My commission expires: 
iry 
Residing at Moab, Utah 64532 
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APPENDIX "B" 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
vs. INTERROGATORIES 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
The defendant Grand County School District answers plain-
tiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
1. State whether or not Elmer E. Dravage, in his capacity 
as Business Manager of the Board of Education for the Grand 
County School District or in any other position as an agent for 
the Grand County School District, had a conversation with 
Jolene Welch at the time she was hired as a bus driver wherein 
he outlined the benefits of the job. 
Objection: Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous. Use of the term "bene-
fits of the job," without clarification, is misleading and sub-
ject to various interpretations. 
Answer: Without waiving the objection stated above, upon 
information and belief, defendant asserts that Mr. Elmer E. 
Dravage met briefly with plaintiff Jolene L. Welch at or about 
the time she was first employed as a bus driver by the Grand 
County School District. 
2. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 is in the affir-
mative, please relate the substance of the conversation. 
Objection: The objection stated to Interrogatory No. 1, 
next above, is incorporated herein by reference. 
Answer: Without waiving the aforementioned objection, upon 
information and belief, defendant states that at the brief 
meeting between Mr. Dravage and Ms. Welch, which occurred at or 
near the time when Ms. Welch was first hired by defendant, the 
conversation was limited to introductions and pleasantries, and 
the formalities of completing and signing applications or forms 
for State Retirement, Group Hospital Insurance, and tax with-
holding (W-4). 
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3. Please state whether or not bus drivers in 1981 
enjoyed the same negotiated benefits of employment that the 
educators had gained by negotiation through the G.E-A. Union, 
with the exception of the number of days for sick leave. 
Answer: No. 
4. If they did not enjoy the same benefits, please state 
the benefits the bus drivers had, and how they were different 
from those enjoyed by the educators. 
Answer: In 1981, Grand County School District bus drivers 
were not represented by the G.E.A. or any other union. Bus 
drivers were classified personnel and as such negotiated 
individually with the School District for the purpose of enter-
ing into employment contracts. The benefits enjoyed by the 
Grand County School District bus drivers included: 
(a) Nine month employment period (commonly referred 
to as a school year); 
(b) Five days of sick leave per school year; 
(c) Sick leave accumulation up to fifteen days, but 
upon termination such accumulated sick leave would not be con-
verted to money payment; 
(d) One day personal leave per school year; 
(e) No vacation time; 
(f) Two days death and funeral leave per school year; 
(g) Participation in group hospital insurance plan. 
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(h) Participation in disability insurance plan. 
Educators' benefits included, but were not necessarily 
limited to: 
(a) Public service leave with partial pay; 
(b) Extra pay for certain extra-curricular activities; 
(c) Sabbatical leave pay; 
(d) 6.E.A. representation at contract negotiations 
with the school district; 
(e) Participation in the state retirement pension 
program; 
(f) Long-term disability insurance benefits; 
(g) Group medical and hospital insurance benefits; 
(h) Class size and total student load constraints; 
(i) Protection through the District's "Orderly Ter-
mination Procedure"; 
(j) Protection through the District's "Grievance Pro-
cedure"; 
5. Please provide a copy of the policies you relied upon 
in the Second Defense which you allege provide for orderly ter-
mination procedures as to certain classifications of employees. 
Answer: Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the 
Grand County School District's "Orderly Termination Procedure." 
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6. If you will do so without a Motion to Produce, please 
provide a copy of the termination notice you allegedly fur-
nished the plaintiff. 
Objection: Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it misstates the record, which is void of any 
allegation by defendant that defendant furnished the plaintiff 
with a termination notice. 
7. Please state how often performance evaluations were 
conducted on the plaintiff and provide copies of all perfor-
mance evaluations of the plaintiff's work. 
Answer: Defendant Grand County School District did not use 
a regular performance evaluation form during the time plaintiff 
was employed with the School District. Plaintiff's perfor-
mance, however, was reviewed on an ongoing basis by Mr. Anthony 
Pene, Supervisor of Transportation for Grand County School 
District. With respect to bus driver performance, Mr. Pene 
reported directly to Superintendent Bill D. Meador and the 
Grand County School Board. Defendant is not in possession of 
any written evaluation of plaintiffs employment performance. 
8. Please state the basis of your denial that plaintiff 
would continue to have her job as long as her work performance 
was satisfactory. 
Answer: All Grand County School District bus drivers are 
hired for a nine month period, generally referred to as a 
-5-
school year. At the end of the school year, and prior to the 
beginning of the next school year, a bus driver may be rehired 
for the next nine month, school year period. 
9. Please describe the procedure wherein yearly contracts 
are sent out each June to educators and bus drivers, and what 
procedures are used to determined proposed variations in con-
tracts. 
Objection: Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it is based on an assumption of inaccurate and 
incorrect facts, and is therefore ambiguous. 
Answer: Without waiving the aforementioned objection, 
defendant states that with respect to bus drivers hired by the 
School District, the Board of Education determines on an annual 
basis the number of bus drivers needed for that particular 
school year. Inquiries are made of prospective bus drivers 
already in the employ of the District whether these drivers 
would be available for employment during the next school year. 
If school bus driver positions are available for the next 
school year, and a prospective bus driver answers the inquiry 
in the affirmative, a letter is sent to the prospective bus 
driver stating the employment terms for the next school year. 
The bus driver is requested to sign the letter if the terms of 
employment are agreeable. Once a signed letter is received by 
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the School District, that particular bus driver position is 
deemed filled for the coming school year. 
10. Please state the basis for your denial of paragraph 9 
of plaintiff's Bill of Complaint by outlining all the steps 
that you had taken to comply with Section 41-6-115, Utah Code 
Annotated, in September, 1983, including but not limited to 
listing the make and model of all equipment owned pursuant to 
the dictates of that statute. 
Objection: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, burdensome and oppres-
sive and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
11. Please state the substance of the conversation between 
Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on January 6, 1984. 
Answer: Superintendent Meador has no present recollection 
of any conversation he had with the plaintiff on January 6, 
1984. Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing 
and additional facts may be discovered at a later date. 
12. Please state the substance of the conversation between 
Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on January 30, 1984. 
Answer: Superintendent Meador has no recollection of any 
conversation between him and the plaintiff on January 30, 
1984. Superintendent Meador does recall, however, that on 
January 31, 1984, plaintiff came to Superintendent Meador1s 
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office and informed him that she could not return to work for 
another six week period and did not know if her doctor would 
release her for work at that time. Superintendent Meador and 
plaintiff discussed plaintiff's medical condition, and at that 
time Superintendent Meador informed the plaintiff that the 
School District would hire a new bus driver on a full-time 
basis, but that the School District would maintain plaintiffs 
health insurance coverage through June 30, 1984. 
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing 
and additional facts may be discovered at a later date. 
13. Please state the substance of the conversation between 
Superintendent Meador and the plaintiff on May 17, 1985. 
Answer: Superintendent Meador has no present recollection 
of any conversation between him and the plaintiff on May 17, 
1984. Superintendent Meador, however, does recall that at some 
time in May, 1984, plaintiff once again came to his office to 
discuss her employment situation. At that time, Superintendent 
Meador informed plaintiff that the plaintiff had been replaced, 
but that plaintiff could reapply for a bus driving position if 
and when she became physically capable of performing the duties 
required of a regular, full-time bus driver. 
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing 
and additional facts may be discovered at a later date. 
-8-
14. Please state the facts you intend to rely upon in your 
affirmative defense wherein you allege plaintiff failed to 
mitigate her damages. 
Answer: Even though plaintiff alleges that she was 
entitled to the provisions of the Grand County School District 
"Orderly Termination Procedures/1 plaintiff has never asserted 
any right to, nor has she actually attempted to, begin such 
procedure. Plaintiff has never furnished Grand County School 
District with any evidence that she was physically capable of 
resuming her duties as a regular, full-time bus driver. Even 
though plaintiff was advised by Superintendent Meador that 
plaintiff could make application for employment with the School 
District for the 1984-85 school year, plaintiff did not do so. 
Investigation and discovery in this matter is continuing 
and additional supporting facts may be discovered at a later 
date. 
15. Please describe the acts or omissions of the defen-
dant, that you allege in your fourth defense were undertaken in 
good faith, without malice, with probable cause, and describe 
how they were justified. 
Answer: Defendant affirmatively asserts that each and 
every action complained of by plaintiff in plaintiff's 
Complaint was undertaken in good faith, without malice, with 
probable cause, and therefore was justified. 
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16. State whether or not you intend to assert that plain-
tiff's inability to work was due to an unwillingness to perform 
the tasks attendant to her employment. 
Objection: Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it requests information which is the work product 
of defendant's attorneys and/or information which is protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, and is therefore not reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
17. Please provide a copy of the policies and procedures 
covering bus drivers in the Grand County School District. 
Answer: Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of the 
policies and procedures of the Grand County School District 
dealing with classified personnel, which includes policies and 
procedures for bus drivers in the Grand County School District. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of April, 1985. 
ANSWERS BY: 
Bill B. Meador, Superintendent 
Grand County School District 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss • 
COUNTY OF GRAND ) 
Bill B. Meador, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the Superintendent of Grand County School District, 
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that he has been authorized to make in its behalf the foregoing 
Answers to Interrogatories; that he makes said Answers on 
information and belief, and that he is informed and believes 
that said Answers are true and correct. 
&L ^^ L^S^L^ 
Bill B. Meador 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /Q7*- day of April, 
1985. 
My Commission Expires: 
SCM1508P 
Notary Public % A ,V , 
Residing at: rlo^h^ Qjjk 
OBJECTIONS BY: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
AND BY: 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Deferidfattt 
-UuK. 
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Rcceived a copy of the Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories in Civil No. 5233 in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Grand County, State of Utahf this 10th day of 
April, A. D., 1985. 
COFFMAN & COFFMAN 
At^opneys tojf P la int i f f , 
L. wMch 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Personnel 
Orderly Termination Procedure 
Decisions to not re-employ certificated personnel for a new 
school tern will be made by the Board of Education upon recommenda-
tion of the Superintendent. 
The Grand County Board of Education by resolution establishes the 
following procedures for the orderly termination of educators 
without discrimination. 
As used 1n this regulation: 
1. "Contract term" or "term of employment" means the period of 
time an educator 1s engaqed by the school district pursuant to 
a contract of employment whether oral or written. 
2. "Dismissal" or "termination" means: 
A. Any termination of the status of employment of an educator. 
B. Failure to renew the employment contract of an educator 
who pursuant to the employment practices of the school 
district has a reasonable expectation of continued employ-
ment 1n successive years. (4117.A) 
C. Reduction 1n salary of an educator not generally applied to 
all educators of the same category In the employ of the 
school district durlnq such educator's contract term. 
D. Change of assignment of an educator with an accompanying 
reduction In pay, unless such assignment change and 
salary reduction is agreed to In wiitlnn. 
3. "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and professional 
personnel of the school district who hold positions requiring 
certification and valid certificates Issued to them by the State 
Board of Education. 
Every educator is entitled to the right of a fair hearing concerning 
his/her employment status or after recelvlnq notice of Intent not to 
re-employ. Request for such hearing must be made In writing to 
the Superintendent within fifteen days of date of said notice. The 
Board of Education or its hearinn examiners will within fifteen days 
after due notice and on demand of the educator meet to conduct a 
hearing. 
If the district Intends not to renew contract of employment of an 
Individual entitled to employment In succeedlnq years according to 
district personnel program, notice of such Intention shall be given 
the Individual. Said notice shall be Issued at least two months 
Personnel 
Orderly Termination Procedure (continued) 
before the end of the contract term of the Individual* e.g., the school 
year. The notice In wrltlnn shall be served by personal delivery 
or by certified mall addressed to the Individual's last known 
address. The notice shall be dated and contain a clear and concise 
statement that the individual's contract will not be renewed for an 
ensuing tern and the reasons for the termination. 
In the absence of timely notice, an employee Is deemed to be 
re-employed for the succeedInn contract term with a salary based 
upon the salary schedule applicable to the class of employee into 
which the Individual falls. This provision shall not be construed 
to preclude the dismissal of an employee during his contract term 
for cause. 
At least one month prior to 1ssu1nq notice of Intent not to renew 
the contract of the Individual, he shall be Informed 1n writing 
of the fact that continued employment Is 1n question and the reasons 
therefore and given an opportunity to correct the defects which 
precipitated possible nonrenewal. The Individual may be granted 
assistance In his efforts to make correction of the deficiencies 
which may Include Informal conferences and the services of 
applicable school personnel within the district. 
In cases where the district Intends to terminate an Individual's 
contract during his contract term, the district shall give written 
notice of such Intent to said Individual. Said notice shall be 
served by personal delivery or by certified mall addressed to the 
Individual's last known address. Said notice shall be given at least 
fifteen days prior to the proposed date of termination. It shall 
state the date of termination and the detailed reasons for such 
termination. 
notices of Intention not to renew the contract of employment of 
an Individual or of Intention to terminate his contract during 
its term shall advise the Individual that he may request an 
Informal conference before the Hoard or such personnel as the district 
may designate. Request for such hearing shall be made In writing 
to the Superintendent not later than fifteen days after the 
date of said notice has been Issued to the individual. 
This orderly dismissal procedure pursuant to which a contract is 
terminated during Its term herebv Includes the provision that the 
active service of the Individual may be suspended pending a 
heartnq when 1t appears that the continued employment of the 
Individual may be harmful to students or to the district. Individuals 
Involved In this type of action shall receive a written notice of 
4119.1 
Personnel 
Orderly ^ termination Procedure (continued) 
suspension or final termination including findings of fact made by 
the Board when such suspension or termination is for cause. 
At all hearings, after due notice, and on demand of the educator, 
he/she may be represented by counsel, produce witnesses, hear the 
testimony against hixt^her, cross examine witnesses and examine 
documentary evidence. 
The Board of Education of this district is authorized and empowered 
to appoint hearing examiners if it appears to be in the best interest 
of the district or individual concerned and may delegate to such 
hearing examiners or may enter into contracts whereby said hearing 
examiners may make decisions relating to the employment of the educator 
which shall be binding upcn both the educator and the Board. Nothing 
herein shall be construed to limit the right of either the Board or 
the eriunafor to appeal to an appropriate court of law. 
Nothing in this procedure shall be construed to preclude staff re-
duction when necessary to decrease the niiriber of teachers because of 
decreased student enrollment in the district, because of the discon-
tinuance of a particular service, because of the shortage of antici-
pated revenue after the budget has been adopted, or because of school 
consolidations* 
If staff reduction is necessary because of one or more of the above 
described conditions, the following procedure will apply: 
EUSMEHTBIPf 
1* Teachers hired during the last contract year will be released 
first. If more teachers were hired the previous year than the 
number needed in the required reduction, the principal's eval-
uation of teaching effectiveness and reoonmendations will be 
used to determine the individuals retained. 
2. If a particular program is discontinued, teacher/teachers will 
be allowod to transfer to another assignment, providing he/she 
is not a first-year teacher and holds proper certification for 
the position to which he/she will be assigned. 
SECONDARE (6-12) 
1. If a particular program or service is discontinued, the teacher/ 
teachers of that program may transfer to other programs, provided 
an opening is available and he/she holds proper certification 
for the program for which he/she will tove responsibility. 
2. If more than one staff member requests a transfer of teaching 
assignment, with proper certification, the initial contract 
4119.1 
Personnel 
Orderly Termination Procedure (continued) 
year and tine in service will be used as the determining factor 
in making the assignment. If all teachers requiring transfer 
were hired during the same contract year, the principal's ze-
ccmnendations and teacher evaluations will be used to determine 
the individuals retained. 
3. In the event conditions determine that every program, subject, 
or service must be reduced, the contract year will be the deter-
mining factor regarding the staff to be retained. Principals" 
evaluations and recommendations will be used if all staff senrtng 
in the positions to be eliminated were employed during the sans 
contract year. 
Teachers whose services have been satisfactory shall be given a written 
recommendation, upon request, explaining the conditions under which 
the release took place. 
Recall Procedure 
Iteoommendations 
In the event that additional students enroll in Grand County School 
District, or additional revenues beocne available, or other teaching 
vacancies occur, the Board shall recall, if possible, teachers who 
have been laid off before it employs or assigns any additional per-
sonnel to fill teaching assignments. Teachers with the greatest 
seniority, who have the proper certification far the position, shall 
be recalled to available positions first. 
Legal Beference 
Orderly School Termination 
Procedures 
House Bill 108 1973 
pule GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Approved: 8/14/74 Moab, Utah 
Revised: 3/16/82 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Personnel 
Classified Personnel 
The board shall, upon recommendation of the superintendent, 
classify all employees not requiring certification according 
to the provisions of the job assignment 1n effect at the time 
of employment. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Personnel 
Employment £ Conditions of Work 
The superintendent of schools shall establish work schedules, 
provision for absences and other conditions of work In keep-
ing with the board's policies. Working conditions shall be 
designed to promote excellent physical and mental health of 
•11 employees. 
General employment regarding vacations, leaves of absence, 
resignation, re-employment, duties, hours and other natters 
related to the nature of the position not specifically noted 
herein are determined by the board of education upon recom-
mendation of the administrator of the department and the 
superintendent. These will not necessarily be Identical for 
til departments. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Policy 
Personnel 
Recruitment and Selection 
The Grand County Board of Education is ccmnitted to providing equal employment 
opportunity regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, religion, age, 
•ex, handicap, or any other condition as required by various state and federal 
laws. Responsibility for compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 regarding equal employment 
opportunity rests with the superintendent of schools. 
General Qualifications 
Skills - The person employed must have sufficient language, mechanical, compu-
tational, and clerical skill to perform his basic tasks without close supervision. 
Maturity - The person employed must have reasonable emotional' balance and self-
control. 
Facility in Dealing with Others - The person employed must enjoy working with other 
people and must have a natural ease in dealing with students, staff, and members 
of the public with whom he will be in contact. 
Understanding of Department Function - The person employed must have or be able 
to develop very readily a clear understanding of the function of his department 
in operating the school system 
Characteristics of Positions 
Critical - Types of positions in which the cost of errors is high. The cost may 
be in terms of monetary loss, damaged public relations, or disturbed personality 
(as with students) • 
Less Critical - Types of positions in which the cost of errors is low, however 
annoying those errors may be. 
Selection of Employees 
Critical Positions - Persons selerted must be outstanding in each one of the four 
general qualifications listpid above. They may be required to have had experience 
in the type of work they are to do or to be at a certain age level. Persons se-
lected for critical clerical positions may be required to have had college training. 
Less Critical Positions - Persons selected must possess each one of the four general 
<jttlifinatinns listed~above. They shall not be required to have had college train-
ing, past experience, or age beyond that needed for high school graduation. 
Policy 
Adopted: 1/19/70 Grand County School District 
Revised: 7/8/81 Moab, Utah 
4214 
Rule 
Personnel 
Physical Examination 
All bus drivers are required to have a physical examination upon enplayment 
and annually thereafter by a oonpetent medical doctor and file a report of 
the same with the superintendent. The Board shall assime the fee up to arri 
including $20.00 for such examination. 
All lunch roan personnel are required to have a physical examination upon 
employment. The Board shall assume the fee up to and including $20.00 
for such examination. 
The district also reserves the right to require a health examination before 
the employee returns to work following illness, other leave, or at any 
time when the need for such examination may be indicated. 
Rile GRAND COCNIY SCHOOL DISTOICT 
Approved: 8/30/71 MOAB, UTAH 
Revised: B/13/15 
Revised: 7/21/82 
Personnel 
Assignment and Transfer 
Transfer to another position or class shall be based upon a 
consideration of 
1. a change In the entire nature of the job. 
2. increased or reduced, responsibilities. 
3. quality of work performed. 
4. Length of service. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Noab, Utah 
Personnel 
Responsibilities and Duties 
The duties and responsibilities of all classified enployees 
shall be defined 1n accordance with job descriptions adopted 
by the board and published In a separate nanuai. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Personnel 
Teacher Aides 
Teacher aides will be utilized to help remedy the shortage 
of qualified teachers. They can be used to help teachers 
overcome the disadvantages of large classes, but they may 
also be used as resource personnel to enrich the school 
program* or to help teachers In regular classrooms. 
Teacher aides may be used to help pupils who need Individual 
Instruction, working directly under the supervision of the 
teacher; they may also relieve the teacher of some of the 
duties that prevent his giving Individual Instruction to 
pupils in need of It. 
Certain criteria should be established with regard to the* 
selection of teacher aides. The administration shall 
1. carefully select quality Individuals as aides. 
2. Inauguarate a strong program of professional supervision. 
3. place the aide 1n a compatible situation with a good 
cooperative teacher. 
4. provide an adequate In-service training program. 
5. Inform the public and staff regarding the program so that 
It will be properly understood and received. 
Policy GRANO COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Personnel 
4223.4 
Grievances 
The Grand County Board of Education believes that good personnel nanagement 
requires the means by which an employee may present a complaint without 
prejudice of any kind to anyone involved 1n a grievance. 
Definition 
A grievance shall mean a complaint by an employee of the Grand County 
School District that there may have been a violation, misinterpretation 
or Inequitable application or any provision concerning district policies 
or terms and conditions of employment. 
Formal Hearing Officer 
The Board of Education by this policy designates the Superintendent of 
the Grand County School District as the hearing officer dealing with all 
formal grievance procedures as outlined In rule 4223.5 
Policy 
Approved: 10/16/78 Grand County School District 
Revised: 8/15/79 Moab, Utah 
4223.5 
Rules 
Personnel 
Grievances 
Purpose 
The prupose of the grievance procedure is to resolve employee or 
student dissatisfaction Informally, promptly and equitably at the lowest 
supervisory level with the efforts of employee, student and administrator 
being directed toward the objective. 
Procedure 
Step 1 - Informal 
Should an educator or student believe there Is a basis for a grievance, 
he/she should discuss the grievance with his/her building principal or 
the Grand Education PR and R Association Representative (employees) with 
the objective of resolving the matter. Proceedings should be kept as 
Informal and confidential as may be appropriate for its determination. 
This, however, does not limit the right of any employee or student who 
has a grievance to discuss the matter with the superintendent. 
Step 2 - Formal 
In the event the response at the informal and first level of supervision 
proves unsatisfactory, the complaint and decision will be reduced to 
writing and copies forwarded to the Superintendent within ten (10) days 
following the decision. 
Step 3 
Within fifteen (15) days after receiving a written complaint or at a 
time mutually agreed upon, the Superintendent will hold a hearing with 
the aggrieved employee or student. If the aggrieved party is a student 
his/her parents will be invited to the hearing. If the aggrieved is an 
employee a member of the Grand Education Association PR and R committee 
will be invited to attend the hearing. 
Step 4 
Within fifteen (15) days of the hearing the Superintendent will make 
his decision known to the aggrieved party. The decision will be in 
writing and mailed to the aggrieved party at their last known address. 
If the aggrieved employee or student is not satisfied with the decision, 
an appeal may be made in writing within fifteen (15) days requesting a formal 
hearing by the Board of Education. 
Step 5 
Within fifteen (15) days after receiving a written request for a hearing, 
the Board of Education will meet to conduct such hearing. The aggrieved 
party may be represented by legal counsel, or others chosen to act on his/her 
behalf. 
4223.5 (continued) 
Rules 
Step 6 
Within fifteen (15) days after the hearing, the Board of Education 
will notify the complaintant. In writing, of the decision. 
Step 6 will be the final action taken by the district and the Board 
of Education. 
Nothing herein stated in the procedure shall be construed to limit 
the Board of Education of the complaintant to appeal to an appropriate 
court of law. 
No educator, employee or student will suffer reprisals, reduction in 
status or reduction of grades or rights of any nature as a result of 
having presented a grievance or having been a party in interest in the 
grievance procedure. 
Rules 
approved 10/16/78 Grand County School District 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Personnel 
Compensation and Related Benefits 
The board shall fix and order paid the compensation of classi-
fied employees and other employees not requiring certification 
qualifications and shall pay such compensation at least monthly 
on or before the twenty-seventh day of the month. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Personnel 
Salary 6u1des 
A salary schedule for all the work classifications 1n which 
classified personnel are employed shall be adopted annually 
by the governing board. 
Classified employees shall be placed on the salary schedule 
according to job requirements and experience. Such classi-
fication 1s made at the time of appointment. 
Normally, all new employees shall be hired at the first step 
on the schedule for the classification Involved. Credit for 
experience may be allowed and the employee hired at the step 
authorized by the superintendent and screening committee. 
The district may Increase the salaries of Its classified 
employees during a school year by the adoption of a resolution 
to that effect before the beginning of the school year. 
Annual one-step pay Increases will be granted upon completion 
75* of one year of service by July 1. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
4142 (b) 
4232 
Personnel 
Salary Checks and Deductions (continued) 
an annuity contract tdthln the meaning of Section 403 (b)» as amended 
of the Internal Revenue Code for a premium In an amount equal to 
the reduction in salary. Application for such contracts can be 
made on the following dates only: September 15, December 15, March 15, 
and June 15 of each year. 
Policy 6RAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, Utah 
Revised: 8/13/75 
4235 
Personnel 
Hospitalization 
Medical inaurance coverage shall be provided for all full time 
employees, classified and certificated. 
The employee who uorke leee than full time may elect to partici-
pate on the insurance program but must pay the premiums* 
Teaching pereonnel completing their contract for a school year 
but not returning for the forthcoming yeer uill have their group 
health inaurance coverage dropped on June 30th* 
Certificated and other personnel who terminate during the year 
uill have their group health insurance dropped at the and of the 
month in yhich they terminate. 
Teachers new to the dietrlct uill be covered for group health 
ineurence purposes on the first of the month following the 
aigning of their contract. 
Policy GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
adopted: B/30/71 Moab, Utah 
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4241. 
Personnel 
Absences and leaves 
Sick leave cannot be considered as entitlement or as annual leave. Further, 
accumulated sick leave Is not to be considered in final settlement of employees 
whose services are terminated for any reason other than death. Any unused 
portion of accumulated sick leave of any employee who dies while 1n the 
employment of the Grand County School District will accrue to the benefit of 
the surviving spouse or the estate of said employee, at the rate of pay per 
day on the date of death. 
The Board of Education or superintendent nay request evidence of need for 
sick leave in any Instance. In the event an employee misuses or purports 
to misuse the benefits under this policy, he or she will forfeit benefits 
which are due or may accrue to him or her under the terms of this agreement. 
Leave shall be granted to classified personnel, as follows: 
1. Maintenance, Custodial and District Office Personnel 
Length of Employment - 12 Months 
a. Ten (10) days sick leave per year. 
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 30 days, however, accumulated 
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment. 
c. Two (2) days personal leave per year which must be approved by 
Immediate supervisor. 
2. School Secretaries 
Length of employment - 10 Months 
a. Seven (7) days sick leave per year. 
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 21 days, however, accumulated 
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment. 
c. Two (2) days personal leave per year which must be approved by Immediate 
supervisor or principal. 
3. School Lunch Personnel. Bus Drivers, Teacher Aides and Attendance Aides 
Length of employment - 9 months 
a. Five (5) days sick leave per year. 
b. Sick leave can be accumulated up to 15 days, however, accumulated 
sick leave will not be paid on termination of employment. 
c. One (1) day personal leave per year which must be approved by 
Immediate supervisor or principal. 
4. Less than full-time employees 
a. No sick leave 
b. No personal leave 
Personnel 
Vacations/Holidays 
All personnel who terminate may have their vacation time prorated as 
approved by the superintendent. Paid vacation days are non-accumulative 
and must be taken in the year they dre earned; unless at the discretion 
of the superintendent, he deans it necessary that all or part of the 
vacation due should be paid. 
Paid vacation days will be granted classified and certified personnel as 
follows: 
1. Maintenance, Custodial, Transportation, and District Office Personnel 
Length of employment - 12 months. Ten (10) working days after 
completion of one full year of employment. Fifteen (15) working 
days after ten (10) years of employment. 
2. School Secretaries 
Length of employment - 10 months. No vacation time. 
3. School Lunch Personnel and Bus Drivers 
Length of employment - 9 months. No Vacation time. 
4. Teacher Aides 
Length of employment - 9 months. No vacation time. 
The working schedule for full time employed personnel at the District Office 
shall recognize the following holidays and such other days as may be granted 
by the Board: 
Independence Day New Year's Day 
Pioneer Day Easter - Good Friday and Monday 
Labor Day Memorial Day 
Veterans Day (Deer Hunt) 
Thanksgiving (Thursday & Friday) 
Christmas Day 
When any of the days listed above fall on Sunday, the following Monday shall 
be the day of observance; and when any fall on Saturday, the preceding 
Friday shall be the day of observance. 
Policy Grand County School District 
Adopted: 1/19/70 Moab, UT 
Revised: 7/1/74 
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4241.1 (i 
4241.11 
Personnel 
Absences and Leaves (continued) 
5. All full-time classified employees 
a. Two days death and funeral leave under the guidelines established 
for certified employees. 
6. Jury Duty - Full time employees 
a. The district will pay each employee selected for jury duty the 
difference between the amount paid for jury duty and their regular 
salary or wages. 
Policy Adopted: 1/19/70 6RAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Revised: 8/13/75 Moab, Utah 
Revised: 9/21/77 
APPENDIX "C" 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 529-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE 
Plaintiff, ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, moves this 
Court to dismiss plaintiff's Verified Complaint, or, in the 
alternative, to grant Summary Judgment in its favor. Defen-
dant's Motion is based upon the grounds that the allegations 
contained in plaintiff's Verified Complaint, even if assumed to 
be true, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 
and, in the alternative, that, as a matter of law, defendant 
was discharged from performance and the contract upon which 
plaintiff sues was terminated by law upon plaintiffs inability 
to perform thereunder. The legal grounds upon which this 
Motion is based are more fully set forth in the accompanying 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
DATED this day of May, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By (,A^/(}^h^ 
Allan L. /Larson 
AND BY 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SCM1542P 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Grand County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 5233 
Defendant Grand County School District submits the follow-
ing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. In August of 1980, Jolene Welch made application to 
and was hired by Grand County School District as a bus driver. 
See Affidavit of Bill Meador, attached hereto as Exhibit MA.M 
2. In her Verified Complaint, plaintiff claims that, after 
plaintiff was employed by defendant, (a) employment contracts 
would be tendered to her thereafter on an annual basis by 
defendant Grand County School District "provided her work per-
formance was satisfactory" (Verified Complaint at 11 5), (b) "as 
long as her job performance was satisfactory" plaintiff had 
"job security" with defendant (id. at 1f 6), and (c) "her 
employment was for an indefinite term" (j^ d. at 1f 8). 
3. On September 23, 1983 plaintiff was injured in a 
work-related accident. As a result of the injury, plaintiff 
was not able to continue working, entered into the care of a 
physician, and received compensation from the State Insurance 
Fund for the work-related injury. 
4. At the time plaintiff was injured, she was working 
under an employment agreement with defendant Grand County 
School District. This agreement was for the 1983-84 school 
year, covering a nine-month employment period. After the 
injury in September of 1983, plaintiff, under doctor's orders, 
did not return to work. See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories; Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra. 
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5. On January 31, 1984, plaintiff was informed by defen-
dant's Superintendent, Bill Meador, that because of plaintiff's 
inability to return to work defendant would hire a new full-
time bus driver to fill plaintiff's position, but would never-
theless continue plaintiff's health insurance under the employ-
ment agreement through June 30, 1984. From the time of plain-
tiff's injury in September until a full-time driver was hired 
at the end of January, defendant had employed a bus driver on a 
part-time, temporary basis in order to cover plaintiff's bus 
route. See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories; Affidavit of Bill Meador, supra. 
6. At all times pertinent here, Grand County School 
District bus drivers were "classified personnel" of the 
District and were not represented by the Grand Education Asso-
ciation in contract negotiations with defendant School 
District. See Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT ALLEGES A 
"TERMINABLE AT WILL" EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
WITH DEFENDANT AND THUS THE AGREEMENT IS 
TERMINABLE BY EITHER PARTY AT ANY TIME FOR 
ANY REASON. 
Plaintiff alleges in her Verified Complaint that plain-
tiff's employment with defendant Grand County School District 
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"was for an indefinite term." Plaintiff's Verified Complaint 
K 8. This is corroborated by allegations from Paragraphs 5 and 
6 of the Verified Complaint, which state that, according to 
plaintiff, she enjoyed "job security", or perennial employment 
contract offers, as long as her work performance was satisfac-
tory. These allegations unequivocally claim that plaintiff's 
employment with defendant had no definite time period or dura-
tion, but that the term of employment was for an indefinite 
period of time. 
Utah law with respect to employment contracts of indeter-
minate length is stated succinctly in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 
P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979). There the Utah Supreme Court wrote that 
where the employment agreement does not expressly or impliedly 
stipulate the duration of the employment period, "the contract 
is no more than an indefinite hiring which is terminable at the 
will of either party." JId. at 792. The Bihlmaier court fur-
ther declared that: 
When an individual is hired for an indefinite 
time, he has no right of action against his employer 
for breach of the employment contract upon being dis-
charged . . . . [S]ince it was shown [here that] the 
term of employment was indefinite and terminable at 
the will of either party, . . . the plaintiff has no 
right of action against the employer. . • . Therefore, 
the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. . . . 
Id. Bihlmaier followed a line of Utah Supreme Court decisions 
which had adopted as Utah law the "terminable at will" doc-
trine. See Crane Company v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 
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1978), (in the absence of a contract for a definite term, the 
employer may fire an employee "whenever he desires"); Bullock 
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 
559, 562 (1960) (where an employment agreement contains no 
statement on the length of time such employment should last, 
"either party may terminate the employment at will"); Held v. 
American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211-12 
(1957) ("In the absence of something in the contract of employ-
ment for a definite term . . . an employer may lawfully dis-
charge an employee at what time he pleases and for what cause 
he chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an action 
against him."). 
Two recent decisions of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah have acknowledged and applied the "at 
will" doctrine as the law of Utah. In Amos v. Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), the federal court 
quoted from Bihlmaier, supra, and observed that in the 
Bihlmaier decision "the Utah Supreme Court continued to adhere 
to the termination-at-will doctrine and implied that it would 
not recognize a claim for wrongful discharge." Id- at 829. In 
a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment for 
an employer-defendant in a wrongful discharge action, Heward v. 
Western Electric Co., Inc., No. C-81-0904W, slip op. at 3-4 (D. 
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Utah Feb. 18, 1983), the court concluded that "Utah law does 
not recognize plaintiffs implied contract claims as legally 
actionable, especially where the plaintiff's employment con-
tract is indefinite as to duration and terminable at will." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
On its face, plaintiffs Verified Complaint alleges that 
the employment agreement between plaintiff and defendant was of 
indefinite duration. For the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss, 
such allegation must be accepted as true. According to the law 
in Utah, such an employment agreement is terminable at will by 
either the employee or the employer, and, if terminated by the 
employer, the employee has no cause of action for the discharge. 
POINT II. 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT IS NOT TERMINABLE AT WILL, PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXTENDED INABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER 
THE AGREEMENT DISCHARGED OR TERMINATED THE 
AGREEMENT AND/OR EXCUSED DEFENDANT'S NONPER-
FORMANCE. 
Defendant Grand County School District hired bus drivers 
for a nine-month period, generally referred to as a school 
year. In September of 1983, approximately one month after the 
school year began, plaintiff injured her back and did not 
return to work for the remainder of the school year. On 
January 31, four months after plaintiff was injured, defendant 
advised plaintiff that defendant was hiring a full-time bus 
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driver to replace plaintiff, but would continue plaintiffs 
health insurance benefits through June. 
It is a general rule of contract law that, in the absence 
of a stipulation to the contrary, an employment contract for 
personal services is terminated by the employee's sickness or 
disability which renders the employee unable to perform his 
contract. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant S 38, at p. 
114 (1965). There can be little argument that where the sub-
ject matter of an employment agreement is the daily conveyance 
of children to and from school over a long period of time, 
"when the safety of these children and the necessity for the 
exercise by the School District of great care in selecting a 
trustworthy, competent and careful bus driver are taken into 
consideration, such an agreement can only be for the personal 
services of that particular bus driver." Folcruet v. Woodburn 
Public Schools, Or. , 29 P.2d 554, 446-57 (1934). 
As in Folcruet, the employment agreement here in question was 
one for the personal services of plaintiff. By application of 
law, plaintiffs inability to perform those services terminated 
the employment agreement. 
Application of this rule of law to factual circumstances 
not dissimilar to the instant case is found in numerous juris-
dictions. The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Fisher v. Church of 
St. Mary, 497 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1972), applied this rule to affirm 
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a lower court's judgment for the defendant-employer where the 
plaintiff-teacher contracted to teach in defendant16 school 
system for ten months commencing August 31,J/1970, but on 
November 12, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was unable to 
resume her teaching duties prior to April 1, 1971. Defendant 
hired a full-time replacement commencing February 1, 1971. The 
Wyoming court held that "contracts to perform personal acts" 
are made on the implied condition that the parties will be 
alive and capable of performing the contract, so that death or 
disability, including sickness, "will operate as a discharge, 
termination of the contract or excuse for nonperformance." IcL 
at 884 (footnote and citations from five other jurisdictions 
omitted). The court added that "after the breach has become 
material or the prospective incapacity is such as to justify 
termination, the employer has an election to continue the con-
tract or to terminate it." Id. Similar holdings are found in 
Smith v. Bd. of Education of the Ft. Madison Community Sch. 
Dist., 293 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 1980); Shawsheen Dairy, Inc. v. 
Keefe, 29 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1940); Rodriguez v. Civil Service 
Commis'n, 582 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Citizens Home 
Insurance Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1950); 
Oneal v. Colton Consolidated Sch. Dist., 16 Wash. App. 488, 557 
P.2d 11 (1976); see also Annotation 21 A.L.R. 2d 1247. 
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The facts of the instant case showing plaintiff's inability 
to perform her contract during the 1983-84 school year are even 
more compelling than those of Fisher, supra, where plaintiff 
could perform only 2% months of her ten month employment agree-
ment. Here, plaintiff performed approximately one month of her 
nine-month school year contract. In Fisher, the defendant 
school district replaced plaintiff on February 1, after plain-
tiff had performed for 2% months, was then incapacitated for 
another 2% months, and, at the time of replacement, with only 
five months remaining on the contract, her prospective incapa-
city would extend at least until April 1, an additional two 
months. Here, plaintiff performed for one month of her nine-
month personal service contract, and by January 31, when her 
part-time, temporary replacement was given full-time status, 
four months had passed without performance, and plaintiff's 
prospective incapacity (according to plaintiff) would extend 
through the end of the contract period. As in Fisher, plain-
tiff's personal services contract here, by application of law, 
was terminated and defendant was discharged and excused from 
performance when it elected not to continue the contract under 
the circumstances. 
-9-
CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss it must be assumed 
that the allegations contained in plaintiffs Verified 
Complaint are true. The allegation that plaintiffs employment 
contract with defendant was for an indefinite duration alleges 
a terminable-at-will agreement, and, as a matter of law, under 
such an agreement plaintiff has no cause of action for dis-
charge. In the alternative, assuming that plaintiffs allega-
tion of an indefinite contract duration is not true and a ter-
minable-at-will contract therefore was not created, it must 
follow that the contract duration was for a definite period—in 
this case, the nine-month 1983-84 school year. Under this 
nine-month contract, plaintiffs inability to perform more than 
one month of the required nine, as a matter of law, discharged 
this defendant from performance of its obligations under that 
same nine-month contract. 
Therefore, plaintiffs Verified Complaint should be, and it 
is hereby requested that it be, dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action; or, in the alternative, because there is no 
issue as to any material fact, and, by application of law, 
defendant was discharged from performance, summary judgment 
should be, and is hereby requested that it be, granted. 
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DATED this day of May, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 8. MARTINEAU 
SCM1545P 
AND BY 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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EXHIBIT "A 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF 
BILL D. MEADOR 
VS. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF GRAND ) 
BILL D. MEADOR, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts herein set 
forth. 
2. I am presently employed as the Superintendent of Grand 
County School District, and was so employed in 1980 when the 
plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit, Ms. Jolene Welch, was 
first employed by the School District as a bus driver, and I 
have continued in such employment from that time to the present. 
3. Ms. Welch was hired by the School District as a bus 
driver. This position was a "classified personnel" position, 
and, according to the policies and procedures and common prac-
tice of the School District, was to last for one school year 
• a period of nine months from the beginning of school in the 
early fall to the end of school in the late spring. 
4. During the summer vacation months between the end of 
the previous school year and the beginning of the next school 
year, the School District sends a letter to each individual who 
had been employed as a bus driver during the previous school 
year, setting forth the salary offer for employment as a bus 
driver for the next school year. The letter instructs the 
drivers to sign and return the letter by a specific date if 
they desire to accept the offer of employment. Such a letter 
offering another nine-months1 employment as a bus driver was 
sent each summer from 1981 through 1983, to Jolene Welch, 
plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and signed and 
returned by her. See copies of letters attached hereto as 
Appendix "A", 
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5* In September of 1983, after Ms* Welch had signed and 
returned the letter sent to her by the District, and thereby 
accepted the offer of employment for the 1983-84 school year, 
and had performed thereafter under the terms of the agreement 
for approximately one month, plaintiff injured her back while 
at work. Thereafter, she did not return to work for the 
remainder of the school year. 
6. The School District hired a bus driver on a part-time 
or temporary basis to cover Ms. Welch's route until she was 
able to return to work. Four months later, on January 31, 
1984, I informed Ms. Welch that the School District would like 
a bus driver on full-time status in order to give that driver 
full benefits not otherwise available to part-time or temporary 
employees. Ms. Welch informed me at that time that she was 
still under doctor's orders not to return to work, and that she 
probably would not be permitted to return to work through the 
remainder of that school year. 
7. Prom January 31, 1984 through the end of that school 
year, Ms. Welch never informed me at any time that she was 
ready, willing and physically able to return to work. 
8. In January of 1984, after the part-time, temporary bus 
driver had, in effect, filled Ms. Welch's bus driver position 
on a full-time basis for four months without full-time bene-
fits, and in view of the continuing inability of Ms. Welch to 
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resume her employment, it was decided that the part-time, tem-
porary replacement for Ms. Welch should be given full-time 
status and all the benefits associated therewith. It was also 
decided at that time to continue until June 30, 1984, 
Ms. Welch's participation in the group health insurance plan 
provided classified personnel employees of the School District. 
9. The copies of letters attached hereto and referred to 
in paragraph 4, above, are true and accurate representations of 
the letters on file in the administrative offices of Grand 
County School District. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this day of May, 1985. 
Bill D. Meador 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of Mayf 
1985. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
SCM1541P 
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264 SOUTH 4th EAST. MOAB. UTAH 84532 • P.O. BOX 69 • TEL: 259-5317 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Batty Oalton ,. SHI B. M M 
Pras.dant Soptnnitnoe, 
flichard Garcia . ttmart Draw 
V c^aPresKJent Bus.ness Manag< 
Vvonna Hawks 
MichaalAraharl 
Arthur ChWtH»f 
July 17, 1981 
Jolene Welch 
71 E. 3rd S. 
Apt. 4*+*/ 
Moab, Utah 
Dear Ms. Welch: 
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to 
your present position for the school year 1981-82. 
Your salary or hourly wage will be $476.80 per no* . If you 
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or hourly 
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return 
to your supervisor before July 24. 1981 . 
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records. 
•Over 4 hours per day Sincerely, 
$5.96 per hour ^ 
Bill B. Meador 
Super interment 
BBiVrg 
Enclosure 
>*£"'#&&&*>>' QA/7 -£/ 
'QttlUBE 
264 SOUTH 4TH EAST, MOAB, UTAH 84532 • TEL: 259-5317 
JOARD OF EDUCATION 
Ittty Oaftort 
President 
tichard Garcia 
Vice President 
late B Knight 
Michael Arehart 
Irthur Chidester 
ailtB Mtador 
Superintendent 
Elmer E Dravege 
Business Manager 
June 17r 1982 
Jolene Welch 
581 E. Mill Creek 
Moab, Utah 
Dear Miss Welch: 
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to 
your present position for the school year 1982-83. 
Your salary or hourly wage will be $ 524.80 per no . If you 
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or tourly 
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return 
to the School District Office before June 28, 1982 . 
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records. 
Sincerely, 
\J%t^ g. Y)^^* 
Bill B. Meador 
Superintendent 
Enclosure 
^/".Z2-
264 SOUTH 4TH EAST, MOAB, UTAH 84532 • TEL: 259-5317 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Michael*. Arthart 
President 
Nate B. Knight 
Vice President 
Arthur R.ChidttUr 
Marion E. Holyoak 
William J. Murphy 
Silt B Meadi 
Superintended 
Elmar £. Oravafi 
Business Manager 
June 20, 1983 
Jolene Welch 
581 E. Mill Creek 
Moab, Utah 
Dear Miss Welch: 
You indicated earlier this spring that you plan to return to 
your present position for the school year 1983-84. 
Your salary or hourly wage will be $ 532.80 If you 
do, in fact, plan to return and accept the salary or hourly 
terms, please sign this letter in the space provided and return 
to your supervisor before June 27, 1983 • 
You may retain the blue copy of this letter for your records. 
Sincerely, 
Bill B. Meador 
Superintendent 
BB?Vrg 
Enclosure 
/£- *'-*?<* 
DATE 
APPE* 
IN TKE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOh iHAM' COUN'", 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE WELCH, ) RULING ON MOTION 
v TO DISMISS, OR FOR 
IMai m i n , ' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT) 
Defendant. * ri/Il No. 5233 
In fliis cast-,,, the defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint, er in the Alternative, a it ti. n hi .stinuiia i , Judgment 
and has 1 • • - if Mi-itnn aiiduiu nl l-'ointfc arid Authorities in support 
thereof, together with an Affidavit. The plaintiff has filed no 
Objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavits emorandum. 
— f thf> Pleadings and Affidavits on file 
show that - plaintiff entered into an annua'! contract nt rmployment 
covering the nine month ptriod nl i U- 198i-"8A school year as a bus 
diivir; t t she suffered a injury in September of 1983 and was unable 
to perforn -•* • - - ;/ * the contract, and that it twrmw necessary for 
the defendant to re 1 mother employee to perform those duties 
in January of 1984. 
Under these facts, the concl i * * ne defendant 
was justi f itj,rl in irrminaiing the employment c plaintiff lc her inability 
to perform, and that the defendant Is entitled to a Summary Judgment, of 
No Cause of Action. 
- 2 -
THEREFOR, the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and 
directs that the Attorney for the defendant prepare a formal Order to 
that effect. 
DATED this - X day of May, 1985. 
•^'<y 
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE '/ 
/ 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby I'ciiil v that I mailed true am1 correct copies 
foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR SUMMARY Jt IXJME 
depositing the same in the Hnireil Stau.s Mr.;!, postage* prepaid, 
fill lowing i 
Allan "L. "Larson, Esq. and 
Christopher C. Fuller, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411M 
Robert H. Ruggeri, Esq. 
Post Office Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84!>32 
Blair Woods, Esq. 
C0FFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS 
59 East Center Street 
Post Office Box 'J1 
Moab, Utah 84532 
DATED this Jtfhfday of May, 1985. 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone: (801) 529-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Grand County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
Defendant Grand County School District's Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in support thereof, together with an 
Affidavit, were filed by defendant's counsel of record in the 
above-referenced Court on the 13th day of May, 1985. Plaintiff 
filed no Objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavits or 
Memorandum. 
The Court having reviewed, examined and considered the 
Pleadings, Affidavit and Memorandum on file, having previously 
entry No • 
filed ( T f O l l S 
Fee 
Barbara Domenii 
Clerk of Grand Courty — 
issued a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, ox loi Summary Judgment , 
and being fully advised in the piemi ses: 
T>»" Cc «ui t fu"." 'p." plaintiff entered into an annual 
contract of employment with defendant Grand County School 
District covering the nine innritli |»'i md m the I 9 8 3 - 1^84 school 
/? iver; that plaintiff suffered an injury in 
September and was unable to perform her emplr r 
under the contract; and ti'c"'1 u Hu-ditie necessary r. -
tie fendar.t to replace plaintiff with another employee :r January 
of 1984 ft) perform those duties. The Court »i -
matter of Law tha1 Hn ricfentiant Liaini County School District 
was justified in terminating the employment of plaintiff for 
her inability to perform, and that tht» defendant is entitled 
to a Summary Judgment ul No Cause of Action. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant Grand County 
School District's Motion for Summary .iudqiTii.-nt be, and hereby is, 
granted. 
DATED this £0 day of June, 1985. 
IV," TUT COURT: 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
2 SS • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Susan C. Brown, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant 
herein; that she served the attached 
(Case Number 5233 Grand County) upon 
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. 
COFFMAN & COFFMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. O. Drawer J 
Moab, UT 84532-1371 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
P. 0. Box 310 
Moab, UT 84532 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 31st day of May , 1985. 
tykkA_ G> PxifaJJ^J 
Susan C. Brown 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of 
May , 1985^ 
ission Expires ^ ^/-^Residing in th^State of Utah 
sT* r V 
APPENDIX "E" 
COFFMAN, coFFMAN, t D C. 
Aldine J . Coffman, Jr. 
59 East Center Street 
Drawer J 
Moab, Utah 84532-1371 
Telephone: (801)259-5102 
Attorneys *- Plaint i f f 
HI SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IM AMD FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATL «'»' i i ] ivi i 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaint i f f , 
v~ 
GRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant, 
LIV1L HO. 5233 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Jolene ! 
-ecord, Aldine ,1 Coffmar 
Woods •.- ursuant ine ML 
Grant ing Summa^ udgment eH K* 
through 
Coffman, Coffman, t 
nb.;i* rder 
^laint i f f , and the 
Objection thereto f i led by the Defendan* respectful ly requests that 
a Hearing on Ihp matter be sex i ""• following the 
regular \v\ aiif I Mi.1 u»f. calendar. 
DATED this 1st day ol Ju ly . 1985, A . D . 
\9 J r . 
'Coffman, Coffman & Woods. P C, 
Attorneys JPor Plaint i f f 
L / 
NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Counsel for the Plaintiff 
will bring the foregoing "REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT" to be heard 
on the 8th day of July, A . D . 1985. 
DATED this 1st day 
y/Coffman, Co^fman 6 Woods, P.C. 
Attorneys/for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing "REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage 
prepaid, this 1st day of July, A . D . 1985, addressed as follows: 
Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
Christopher C. FuHer, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Post Office Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
District Court Judge 
Court House Building 
Price, Utah 84501 
retarytoCOF^FM 
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THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
-u I 
JOLENE 
v s . 
Plaintiff, 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant . 
N O T I C E O F HEARING 
Civil M r p>?'^ 
TO: Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Allan L. Larson, Christopher C. Fuller 
and Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
YOU, and each of you, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, and you are hereby notified that the 
above entitled case has been set K^XZPm(AX^m}jaS%XtK)M^O(K&XK)»K, to be heard on 
JULY 31, 1985 to follow the Law and Motion calenda: r 10 a.m. 
in the Courtroom of the above entitled Court at Moab, Grand County, Stat? < 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
Dated this 9th day of July , A.D., 19 85 
BARBARA ICK, Clerk 
McGann, Deputy Court Clerk 
Grand County 
125 East Center 
Moab, Utah 84532 
APPENDIX "F" 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS, P.C. 
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. 
59 East Center Street 
Post Office Drawer J 
Moab, Utah 84532-1371 
Telephone: (801)259-5102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant, 
CIVIL NO. 5233 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Grand 
NOW COMES your Affiant, JOLENE L. WELCH, the 
Plaintiff herein, and being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That she is the Plaintiff in this case. 
2. That she did have a contract to drive a Grand 
County School bus for the 1983-1981 school year. 
3. That she was in jured in September, 1983 and 
was under doctor's orders not to re tu rn to w o r k . 
4 . That she kept in contact w i th the School Board 
Superintendent and in January , 1984, he advised her that she 
would be terminated. 
5. That al though your A f f ian t was advised at the 
January meeting that she would be terminated, she was given no 
blue s l ip . She was told that she would be g iven a blue sl ip in May 
and her medical benefi ts were continued un t i l May. 
6. That the School Board Superintendent at no 
time offered to the Plaint i f f a contract for the school year 
1984-1985, even though by Augus t , 1984 she was able and wi l l ing to 
r e tu rn to work , and was otherwise able to enter into negotiations to 
renew her contract . 
7. I t was the policy of the School Board to g ive 
unterminated school bus d r i ve rs the f i r s t r i g h t to renew thei r 
contracts before other bus d r i ve rs were h i r e d . Th is policy was the 
practice of the School Board before and d u r i n g the employment of 
the Plaint i f f . In the case at po in t , at the time that the school bus 
contract should have been offered to the P la in t i f f , when she was, 
physically able to re tu rn to work , the School Board Superintendent 
elected to discharge her without just cause or jus t reason, in 
violation of the practices of the School Board . 
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8. At no time was your Affiant/Plaintiff advised of 
the decision in January to replace her with a full time driver rather 
than a part time driver who would have full times status and all the 
benefits and that she would be -terminated in January. Further, 
the Affiant represents that she advised the School Board through 
her employer and supervisor of her regular attendance on medical 
treatment and when she anticipated to be able to return to work. 
DATED this £ *) day of July, 1985. 
fene L. Welch 
Subscribed and sworn to before me thist^ff iday of 
July, A.D. 1985. 
^M^^^ 
Residing at Moab, Utah 84532 
My commission expires: 
//-/A/g 
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COFFMAN, COFFMAN 6 WOODS, P.C. 
Aldine J . Coffman, Jr. 
59 East Center Street 
Post Office Drawer J 
Moab, Utah 84532-1371 
Telephone: (801)259-5102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant, 
CIVIL NO. 5233 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
based primarily upon the supposition that the Plaintiff was a driver 
for employment at wiJJ because "she was employed for an indefinite 
term". The facts of the case rather indicate that the employee, 
Jolene L. Welch, was an employee by contract for the school year, 
and that as a contract employee for the school year she was 
regularly and systematically offered the first right of refusal to 
renew that contract year to year. Indeed, she Is not an employee 
at will in the sense that at any time during the school year she 
could be terminated without cause and such a termination would be 
a violation of the employment contract that existed between the 
Plaintiff and the School District. 
The law respecting the discharge of an employee at 
will is undergoing a rapid acceleration of change. The current 
issue of the American Bar Association Journal, August, 1985, 
contains an article summarizing the rapid evolution in this field. 
The law review The Business Lawyer published by the Section of 
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association, 
1984, contains perhaps the article on "The Emerging Law of 
Wrongful Discharge". Through May, 1984, thirty (30) of the fifty 
(50) states had Joined the evolving law recognizing an implied 
obligation of an employer to terminate an employee at will, only for 
good cause, and that the absolute right of termination would be in 
violation of public policy, see article, page 1. Since May, 1984, 
other courts have brought the common law of their states In line, 
most notably New Jersey, and in the summer of 1985, the State of 
Utah to the extent that it improved the standards of definition for 
termination of employees for cause in the unemployment 
compensation regulations, Kehl v. Bd. of Review of the tndust. 
Common., No. 20913, Slip op., (Utah May 23, 1985). While the 
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courts themselves have grouped their grounds for so holding into 
various theories, the most common of the theories is summarized in 
the volume Employment Dismissal and Practice Law published by 
John Wiley t Sons, 1984, under Chapter 4, Contract Theories 
Relating to Dismissal. The tort theories and their application to 
employee dismissal cases is the subject of Chapter 5. The 
supplement to that volume recognizes that in 1984 Alabama, Arizona, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Montana, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, and Washington each joined, in one way or another, the 
growing list of states recognizing that employer practices, 
procedures or policies, both written and unwritten, govern the 
employee relationship in contradistinction to the common law concept 
of termination without cause of an employee at will and, 
consequently, in one manner or another, broaden the rights of an 
employee. 
The Defendant's primary argument is that the 
Plaintiffs contract of employment is terminable at will. Their 
second point is that the Plaintiffs inability to perform due to illness 
granted a right to terminate. 
Neither argument is material to the facts. The 
Plaintiff was employed under a contract for a specific period of time 
and that contract was indefinitely renewable so long as the Plaintiff 
adequately performed. Termination is represented to have occurred 
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in January by the Defendant, in the middle of the contract period 
though no blue slip was given at that time and the Plaintiffs 
employment benefits continued until May, at which time the Plaintiff 
was given her termination papers. The Plaintiffs extended inability 
was cured by the time she was terminated and, thus, the argument 
that her extended inability would have precluded her performance, 
at the time of actual termination, is an error in the law and in fact. 
There are genuine disputes of fact before the 
Court. The Plaintiff denies she was terminated in January. The 
documentary evidence shows that she was, in fact, not terminated 
in January, but in May. The failure to offer her a renewal of her 
contract, when she was physically able and willing to do so, merely 
because the School Board Superintendent thought he had fired her 
in January, is an administrative bumbling on the Defendant's side 
and cannot represent a prejudice to the Plaintiff. 
The triable issues in this case are when did the 
School Board actually terminate Ms. Welch, and what were the 
school policies with respect to the renewal of contracts to school 
bus drivers. There is a sufficient conflict in the Affidavits filed 
and In the representations of the evidence to be hearqj by the 
Court that this matter must proceed to trial. 
APPENDIX "G" 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. 0. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL Civil No. 5233 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
Defendant Grand County School District, by and through its 
counsel of record, moves the Court to strike the Affidavit of 
Jolene L. Welch, dated July 29, 1985, on the grounds that informa-
tion sworn to by said affiant in paragraph 7 of said Affidavit 
is outside the realm of personal knowledge of said affiant and 
is directly contrary to documents filed in the above-referenced 
matter by this defendant, which documents were created in the 
ordinary course of this defendant's business, pursuant to regula-
tions requiring same, and the accuracy of said documents having 
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been sworn to by competent Affidavit of the Superintendent of 
defendant. Plaintiff's Affidavit has not affirmatively shown 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters so 
stated in paragraph 7. For these reasons the information as 
sworn is not admissible in evidence. The Affidavit, failing to 
meet the requirements of competency set forth in Rule 56(e), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should therefore be, and it is 
hereby respectfully requested that it be, struck. 
DATED this 1* day of August, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
yLarson 
Jher C. Fuller 
AND BY 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, REPLY MEMORANDUM 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL Civil No. 5233 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
Defendant Grand County School District, by and through its 
counsel of record, submits the following Memorandum in reply to 
plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on 
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
In her Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing on 
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment, plaintiff 
admits that the employment contract in question in the above-
referenced case was a contract for a definite term, that is, 
one school year in duration. Plaintiff contends that she was 
not terminated until May of that contract year, nine months 
after she was injured and could no longer perform her con-
tracted employment responsibilities. Assuming, arguendo, that 
plaintiffs contention, that she was terminated in May rather 
than January of the contract year, is accurate, such contention 
does not change the determination made by this Court that 
plaintiff failed to perform under the terms of the contract, 
and that this defendant was thus justified in replacing plain-
tiff with a bus driver who could perform the services required. 
Whether terminated in January or May, plaintiff has 
provided no evidence that would suggest that she could have 
performed under the contract terms during the contract year in 
question. It is undisputed that plaintiff had entered into a 
contract to drive a bus for defendant, that after the first 
month of the contract period plaintiff was injured and could 
not continue her bus driving duties, and that defendant waited 
at least until the following January, when plaintiff informed 
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defendant that plaintiff could not return to work for the 
remainder of the contract term, before replacing plaintiff with 
a permanent, rather than part-time, driver. During the term of 
the contract, defendant never received medical authorization 
from plaintiff's physician stating that plaintiff was physi-
cally capable of returning to work. 
Thus, according to the law as set forth in defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary Judgment, and as 
applied by this Court in its Ruling and Order Granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendant, this defendant was legally 
justified in terminating the employment of plaintiff for plain-
tiffs inability to perform under the terms of the employment 
contract, and this Court's Summary Judgment was proper. Nei-
ther Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Request for Hearing 
on Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment nor the 
accompanying Affidavit of plaintiff set forth any facts, evi-
dence, or case law authority which requires reconsideration, 
further argument or hearing before this Court on this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and as 
explained in this Court's Ruling and Order Granting Summary 
Judgment, the Summary Judgment ordered, decreed and adjudged by 
-3-
this Court in favor of this defendant was proper and should not 
be set aside. 
DATED this *r day of August, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Christopher C. Fuller 
AND BY 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SCK1680P 
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APPENDIX "H" 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, ) 
Plaintiff, ' 
V. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ; 
Defendant. ' 
} RULING UPON 
. RECONSIDERATION OF 
' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
• JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 5233 
The Court has previously granted the defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment to which the plaintiff had filed no objection. 
Thereafter, the Court determined that the plaintiff's failure to 
respond to the Motion was excusable and allowed the plaintiff to 
submit her objection to the Motion and Counter-Affidavits and Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, and the Court agreed to reconsider its prior 
ruling. 
The defendant has now moved to strike Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's 
Affidavit, and the Court grants the Motion and ORDERS THAT Paragraph 7 of 
the plaintiff's Affidavit be stricken on the ground that it states a 
conclusion not supported by sufficient foundation of personal knowledge. 
After a re-examination of the affidavits, exhibits and other 
pleadings, the Court finds no dispute of fact that the plaintiff, because 
of her physicial disability, was unable to perform her employment under 
the agreement, and that the defendant was justified in terminating her 
employment. 
The Court, THEREFORE, GRANTS THE Motion of Summary Judgment 
of Dismissal in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and 
the Court directs that the Attorney for the defendant prepare a new 
Judgment of Dismissal in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this & day of September, 1985. 
-Page Two-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RULING UPON RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
A. J. Coffman 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN & WOODS 
Attorneys at Lav 
Post Office Box J 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Allen L. Larson 
Christopher C. Fuller 
SNOW, CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place> Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
PATED this £>T/i day of September, 1985. 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "I" 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 6 MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange P l a c e , E l e v e n t h F l o o r g*~u* 
P o s t O f f i c e Box 3000 *7?W 0 SZid-fe 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110 ™ a — J " r T * 
Te lephone: (801) 521-9000 M e Barbara Dorm 
ROBERT H . RUGGERI Clerk of Grand County 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL Civil No. 5233 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
Defendant Grand County School District's Motion to Dismiss, 
or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in support thereof, together with an 
Affidavit, were filed by defendant's counsel of record in the 
above-referenced Court on the 13th day of May, 1985. Plaintiff 
filed no objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavit or Memor-
andum. On May 28, 1985, this Court issued a Ruling granting 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and on June 10, 1985, 
signed an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of defendant 
Grand County School District. 
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On June 19, 1985r plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Summary Judgment, accompanied by an Affidavit from plaintiff's 
counsel and a Memorandum. Defendant subsequently filed an 
Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order Granting 
Summary Judgment, accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition thereto. 
On July 31, 1985, pursuant to proper Notice, arguments 
were heard before this Court on plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
Order Granting Summary Judgment, both parties being represented 
by counsel of record. At said hearing plaintiff presented to the 
Court am Affidavit signed by plaintiff and a Memorandum prepared 
by plaintiff's counsel. Within seven days, defendant filed a 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit and a Reply Memorandum 
in response to plaintiff's Memorandum of July 31, 1985. 
By Ruling of this Court on September 6, 1985, defendant's 
Motion to Strike was granted such that paragraph 7 of plaintiff's 
Affidavit was stricken on the ground that said paragraph states 
a conclusion not supported by sufficient foundation of personal 
knowledge. 
WHEREFORE, the Court having re-examined the affidavits, 
exhibits, pleadings and memoranda on file, having earlier issued 
a Ruling and entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of defendant, having heard argument of counsel with regard to 
setting aside said Summary Judgment, having issued a second 
Ruling also in favor of defendant, and being fully advised in 
the premises: 
The Court concludes that there exists no dispute of material 
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fact that plaintiff, because of her physical disability, was 
unable to perform her employment under the employment agreement 
entered into with defendant; that defendant was thereby justi-
fied in terminating her employment; and that, as a matter of 
law, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendant, 
no cause of action; 
NOW, THEBEFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff9s Complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed 
with prejudice and upon the merits, and judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action. 
DATED this^^J? day of \^y^/fO^^ , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
-3-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief by mailing four copies to Penelope D. Coffman at Coffman 
& Coffman, Attorneys for Appellant, at 59 East Center Street, 
Drawer J, Moab, Utah 84532-1371, this 8th day of January, 
1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
